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Abstract. We develop a compositional framework for modelling security and
business architectures based on rigorous underlying mathematical systems mod-
elling technology. We explain the basic architectural model, which strictly sep-
arates declarative specification from operational implementation, and show ar-
chitectures can interact by composition, substitution, and stacking. We illustrate
these constructions using a running example based on airport security and an
example based on (cloud-based) outsourcing, indicating how our approach can
illustrate how security controls can fail or be circumvented in these cases. We ex-
plain our motivations from mathematical modelling and security economics, and
conclude by indicating how to aim to develop a decision-support technology.
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1 Introduction
The development of utility computing platforms, such as cloud, and the business ecosys-
tems that they can support, has emphasized clearly the need for systematic approaches
to designing and reasoning about security architectures, their associated policies and
investment requirements, and their relationship with the core operational concerns of
the business model. Moreover, as such systems become integral parts of hybrid cyber-
physical systems, the need to identify unifying conceptual structures becomes pressing.
But security and business architectures (they should, of course, be considered to-
gether) cannot be understood in isolation from the underlying systems architecture. We
propose a conceptual framework (building directly on some earlier basic ideas [1]) for
describing security and business architectures that integrates directly with an underlying
account of the components of the supporting (distributed) system [2] and an associated
account of mathematical systems modelling [3–6]. Building on these foundations, we
can hope for a framework that is capable of addressing such challenging issues as how
to identify vulnerabilities, and potential attacks, that may arise from the interaction of
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otherwise appropriately secure architectures. To this end, it is essential that our account
of security and business architectures be compositional.
Our approach to a conceptual architecture for security and associated business pro-
cesses is inspired by several key influences. First, a rigorous yet applicable and ro-
bust theory of mathematical systems modelling (supported by a simulation tool [4, 7])
that will support the requisite compositionality. Second, an increasingly well-developed
economics-based account of decision-making about trade-offs in security [8, 9]. Third,
a desire to deliver ontologically valuable, executable tools to support decision-makers.
Our presentation in this paper is intended to be informal but careful.
In § 2, we summarize our underlying approach to system modelling, aspects of
which are needed for our subsequent discussion. In § 3, we explain the basic model
of security architecture hierarchies that sits on top of this modelling approach. We use
an example that, whilst chosen to be familiar to most readers, illustrates that our ap-
proach, though motivated by information architectures, is more broadly applicable. In
§ 4, we discuss the various ways in which hierarchies can interact in order to combine
to form more complex architectures — and so allows us to see how complex situations
are composed of simpler ones, so allowing the sources of some security issues to be
examined. In § 5, we extend our running example to encompass aspects of outsourc-
ing to the cloud. We conclude, in § 6, with a short discussion of our ongoing work in
integrating our structural and economics-based approaches into decision-support tools.
2 Systems Modelling and Systems Economics
2.1 The Core System Concepts
Our underlying approach to mathematical systems modelling builds on a body of theo-
retical work [3–6, 10], an implemented tool, Core Gnosis, [4, 7, 3], and a body of prac-
tical modelling experience (see [3] for references). The approach builds on identifying
four key concepts, which can be seen as building on a body of basic work in the the-
ory of distributed systems as summarized, for example, rather elegantly in [2]. The key
notions are those of location, resource, process, and environment, as described below.
We mention briefly our mathematical treatment of these concepts, as captured in Core
Gnosis and reported extensively elsewhere [3, 4, 7] , but defer any detailed use of these
concepts to another occasion.
Location. Locations are the logical and/or physical places in the system architec-
ture at which resources are located. They are connected by links. Mathematically, our
treatment of location begins with some observations about some natural and basic prop-
erties of locations [3, 5]: a collection of atomic locations — the basic places — which
generate a structure of locations; a notion of (directed) connection between locations —
describing the topology of the system; a notion of sublocation (which respects connec-
tions); a notion of substitution (of a location for a sublocation) that respects connections
— substitution provides a basis for abstraction and refinement in our system models.
Leading examples are provided by various constructions on (directed) graphs.
Resource. The logical and/or physical entities that enable and are manipulated by
the processes that describe the system’s operations/services. Mathematically, our notion
of resource — which encompasses natural examples such as space, memory, and money
— is based on (ordered, partial, commutative) monoids (e.g., the non-negative integers
with addition, zero, and less-than-or-equals), which capture basic conceptual notions
of resource composition and comparison: each type of resource is based on a basic set
of resource elements; resource elements can be combined (and the combination has a
unit); resource elements can be compared.
Process. Processes describe the system’s operations; the services it provides. Math-
ematically, we consider a process algebra that is similar to Milner’s SCCS [11], but
which incorporates notions of location and resource [3–5].
Environment. Such an architecture, as described in terms of location, resource, and
process, works well conceptually, but it is isolated — that is, it is not connected to the
environment within which it exists. For example, developed below, the processes that
describe an airport’s security operations apply to passengers (and their luggage) who
arrive at the terminal building from the outside world. Clearly, for our present purposes
at least, we are not interested in modelling the outside world in any detail. Nevertheless,
we must have some way of modelling passenger arrivals at the boundary of our system
of interest. In our system modelling point of view, in common with established practice
in discrete event simulation, the approach taken is to employ stochastic models of event
occurrences (cf. below, the arrival of passengers or other agents).
The incidence of events upon the system of interest is represented by an appropriate
choice of probability distribution. Once the model has been connected to its environ-
ment in this way, it can be executed, explored, and validated using discrete-event and
Monte Carlo-style simulation methods. Core Gnosis, which implements the approach to
mathematical systems modelling described above, allows the exploration of a model’s
properties by Monte Carlo-style experiments.
2.2 A Running Example
We will illustrate our approach to modelling security and other operational architectures
using a running example based on airport security. To set this up, we first explain,
informally, the underlying system model corresponding to this example, in terms of
its locations, resources, processes, and environment. The basic set-up is illustrated in
Fig. 1. Running Example: Airport Security Locations Directed Graph (Simplified)
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Fig. 1 (cf. [1, 12]), which describes the locations — from the public area outside of
the architecture, via airside, to the aircraft — in an airport that are significant for the
security architecture, the purpose of which is to ensure the suitability of passengers
to be admitted onto aircraft. A passenger (perhaps with luggage) must navigate from
groundside to airside, passing through a sequence of checks. These checks are processes
that are applied to, or act upon, various resources, at particular locations.
The environment turns this static view into a dynamic one by introducing actors
into the system. For example, the arrival of passengers at the airport’s terminal building
might be captured by a negative exponential distribution, negexp(λ), where the rate pa-
rameter λ gives the mean time between passenger arrivals. Similarly, we might capture
the arrival of passengers carrying prohibited items with a different negexp parameter.
3 The Basic Architecture Model
Following [1], there are two key layers in our representation of a security architecture,
the Framework Layer and Instantiation Layer. Both are organized through a common
hierarchy of roˆles, each roˆle sub-divided into dependencies, priorities, and preferences.
The hierarchy contains all the relevant roˆles that make up the organization being
modelled. Roˆles are ordered by their ability to influence the security architecture of
the system. In other words, they are classified by the toolbox that is available to them
for modifying Security Objects (that characterize security tasks, defined below). The
system accepts multiple and partial orderings. For example, the top level of the model
might represent the strategic decision-makers of the organization, such as an airport’s
security managers or their regulators, while the bottom level might represent an indi-
vidual employee or user of the organization, such as an airport’s check-in staff or a
passenger navigating airport security. The roˆles, representing positions in the hierarchy
that individuals can adopt, do not represent any entity themselves. They are instead pop-
ulated by actors, which are another component in the system and are described below.
Each hierarchy level contains three sections representing the dependencies, priori-
ties and preferences of that level. For our purposes we define the terms as follows:
– Dependencies (strong requirement): Externally enforced requirements that actors
populating the roˆle must meet all of in order to function within the model. Actors
occupying this roˆle have no choice in whether or not (and possibly even how) to
meet these requirements regardless of how resource inefficient they are. Dependen-
cies will often be informed by the environment within which the hierarchy exists;
– Priorities (weak requirement): Externally supplied tasks, as many as possible of
which should be met by actors in the associated roˆle. Actors have some choice
in which priorities to meet and how they are approached. In a limited resource
environment, actors can select the most resource efficient priorities and methods
first. Priorities will often be informed by the roˆle that the level represents;
– Preferences: Actor-generated tasks that an actor has decided are worth doing from
its own perspective — can be derived from an actor’s roˆles in other hierarchies.
Dependencies, priorities, and preferences (DPP) and the hierarchy of roˆles structure are
found in both the Framework Layer and the Instantiation Layer.
The use of dependencies, priorities, and preferences is inspired, as described in [1],
by utility theory and its use to study resource allocation and investment in information
security, as described in [8, 9]. Dependencies and priorities are driven by the utility of
the policy-makers that are responsible for the hierarchies (e.g., governments, regulators,
system owners/managers). Preferences, representing much weaker choices, are driven
by the users of systems (e.g., managers, employees, customers). A systematic integra-
tion of these utility-theoretic perspectives is beyond the scope of this short paper.
The form and construction of the security architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. The
key components of this diagram are the following:
Fig. 2. Security Architecture: Basic Hierarchy
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– The hierarchy of roˆles (far left). Roˆles capture the relevant security or business
management structure of the organization being modelled. They are ordered by
their ability to influence the security architecture of the system;
– The Framework Layer (centre left). The Framework Layer is constructed top-down.
Dependencies and priorities at a given level in the hierarchy induce dependencies
and priorities at lower levels;
– Security Objects (trees within Framework Layer, with the requirements at parent
nodes being devolved to requirements at child nodes). Security Objects represent
the security tasks which, if completed, will satisfy the dependencies and priorities
with which they are associated;
– The Instantiation Layer (centre right). The Instantiation Layer is constructed bottom-
up, starting where the Framework Layer finishes (see below). The Instantiation
Layer is a populated image of the Framework Layer;
– Security Components (nodes of trees within Instantiation Layer ). Security Compo-
nents perform the operational checks required in order to deliver Security Objects.
They do so by returning boolean values up the tree, towards the root, from parent
nodes to child nodes, thereby implementing the dependencies and requirements in
the corresponding nodes (i.e., those at the same roˆle level) of the Framework Layer.
They enter the architecture when the Framework is instantiated;
– Actors (far right). Actors occupy roˆles. They insert preferences into the hierarchy
of roˆles at the Instantiation Layer.
3.1 The Framework Layer
The Framework Layer represents the underlying architecture. It is declarative, describ-
ing requirements, but informs the construction of the corresponding operational Instan-
tiation Layer, providing implementation. A Framework Layer consists in a hierarchy of
roˆles (cf. RBAC models of access control), with dependencies and priorities assigned to
them. Preferences appear in the Instantiation Layer, below, not the Framework Layer.
The dependencies and priorities each have a Security Object (SO) associated with them.
SOs are a unique component of the Framework Layer and represent the security require-
ments which, if delivered, will satisfy the dependencies and priorities with which they
are associated. A typical SO will exist at multiple levels and multiple sections (de-
pendency, priority) in the Framework Layer. It will commonly be the case that an SO
created at a higher level will transition through and connect (or create) priorities and
dependencies lower in the framework.
For example, in the setting of the running example of airport security that we have
begun to introduce, examples of Security Objects include the examining of checked
luggage, the checking of hand luggage and passengers — to identify and so remove
any prohibited contents — and the tracking of the relationship between passengers and
checked luggage. These examples are developed below.
More mathematically, there are many choices of formalization of SO. Our working
choice for the purposes of this paper is, roughly speaking, the following:
– SOs are characterized by (directed) and/or forests1 2 (Fig. 2, trees in the Framework
Layer) associated with dependencies and priorities;
– Internal nodes of the trees are labelled with boolean variables, each associated with
a dependency or priority; truth conditions are inherited upwards (towards the root);
– Leaves are nodes for which a boolean instantiation (all components for conjunc-
tions, one component for disjunctions) can be determined at the next level down in
the hierarchy of roˆles.
Dependencies and priorities are externally generated. In practice, a hierarchy will
not encompass all possible contributors to the framework and will be bounded at some
sensible level. In our example, we have not represented any roˆle higher than the airport
security manager. To populate a hierarchy, it is necessary to determine the dependencies
and priorities that the top roˆle inherits from sources external to the hierarchy. The next
step is to assign Security Objects to these dependencies and priorities: see Table 1,
where down the table one navigates down the Framework Layer along an SO.
Note, for example, that the SO ‘scan luggage and passengers’ corresponds to a tree
(in Fig. 2) in the Framework Layer. Starting as a node at the Manager’s roˆle level, it
passes to two nodes at the Airport Security Staff level, and acquires a boolean value
at the Passenger roˆle level (true/false that the passenger and luggage contents are per-
mitted) and will terminate. An SO must always terminate with such a compliance re-
quirement. Table 1 neglects (below the Manager’s level) the SOs related to checked
luggage.
1 A (directed) forest is a disjoint union of (directed) and/or trees.
2 A forest is required because a given SO may, in general, derive from more than one dependency
or priority.
Table 1. Roˆles, Dependencies, and Security Objects
Roˆle Dependencies Security Objects
Airport Secu-
rity Manager
Ensure no prohibited materi-
als transit the airport
Scan checked luggage
Scan hand luggage and passengers
Track relationship between passengers and
checked luggage
Airport Secu-
rity Staff
Examine all passengers and
luggage passing through se-
curity checkpoint
Identify contents of hand luggage and ver-
ify permitted
Put passenger through metal detector
Passenger Comply with SO
3.2 The Instantiation Layer
Whereas the Framework Layer is declarative, the Instantiation Layer is operational.
Two new parts of the architecture are added during instantiation, Security Components
(SC) and actors. Actors occupy roˆles and insert preferences into the hierarchy of roˆles at
the Instantiation Layer. Security components combine together to form the operational
counterparts of security objects.
The Instantiation Layer is built from the bottom up. SCs lay out the processes and
resources needed to perform the boolean checks specified in corresponding SOs. SCs
start at the final ‘compliance’ level of the SO. Once the processes and resources required
at this level are in place, we check they are sufficient to complete the SO. If yes, then the
SC terminates. If not, then we move up to the roˆle above and add additional processes
and resources as needed. Again, this process repeats until all SCs are closed. At this
point, the Instantiation Layer is complete.
A little more formally, corresponding to the slightly more formal view of SOs
sketched above, we can describe how SCs are combined to instantiate SOs as follows:
– SCs are combined according to the and/or forest of the SO that they instantiate;
– Each SC implements a checking process that applies to Actors at the level below;
– SCs return boolean values that instantiate internal nodes of the corresponding SO.
Working through our example again, we work upwards from Passenger until we
have sufficient processes and resources in place to return a boolean for the statement
‘the passenger and luggage are permitted’. The SCs in this case would be as in Table 2,
in which reading up the table one navigates up the Instantiation Layer, along an SC.
In Fig. 2, the SCs correspond to the trees in the Instantiation Layer. Note that
whereas the SO terminated in a ‘compliance’ level the SC terminates at a ‘provision’
level when it reaches a roˆle that can sufficiently provide the resources required to exe-
cute the SC without recourse to a higher roˆle.
The final component of the Instantiation Layer (and the architecture) are actors.
Actors exist independently of any single hierarchy, being entities that can inhabit roˆles
in multiple hierarchies, this being the key difference between actors and SOs. They can
interact with any and all hierarchies present, simultaneously if necessary.
Table 2. SCs
Roˆle Dependencies Security Components
Airport Security
Manager
Ensure no prohibited materi-
als transit the airport
Provide resources (X-ray machine,
metal detector, wands)
Provide data on prohibited materi-
als for X-ray comparison
Airport Security
Staff
Examine all passengers and
luggage passing through se-
curity checkpoint
Monitor X-ray machine and inspect
results for prohibited items
Hand-search suspect luggage
Hand-scan suspicious passengers
Passenger Comply with SO Place luggage on scanner
Walk through detector
3.3 Context and Related Approaches
The use of actors populating roˆles, and of relations between roˆles in organizations and
in society, has been an important theme in sociology since the mid-twentieth century
[13–15]. Indeed, much everyday language now incorporates terminology from that re-
search. The present work is influenced only indirectly — and perhaps unconsciously
— through the shared language. Indeed, the focus of the present paper is on setting
down in precise, mathematical terms the structure of organizations with a particular fo-
cus on their security function. A specific impact of this cultural heritage can be seen in
the development in computer security of RBAC, analyzed in the context of the system
modelling that underpins this work in [10].
Task Knowledge Structures (TKS) [16] provide a mechanism by which the organi-
zation of knowledge the users employ in order to solve problems can be used to support
system design, and an alternative approach to task modelling is given in [17].
An alternative approach to systems modelling is provided by System Dynamics [18]
explored in the business process modelling context in, for example, [19] and security
[20]. System Dynamics is focussed on the dynamics of system models, and does not
consider structural properties such as location or the structural properties of resource
and process. It also lacks the associated logic of states afforded by our approach [3–6]
(and needed, we submit, to consider architecture). Human factors in systems security
have been considered by many authors, (e.g., [21–23, 20] are relevant examples for this
paper) with social interactions between actors being considered in, for example, [24].
4 Interacting Architectures
The basic architecture model works well for a describing a single, clearly delineated
process, such as airport security operations or airport airside business operations. This
level of analysis was sufficient for the concerns of [1].
Typically, however, organizations operate many such processes simultaneously, and
all of these processes may interact with one another, possibly in unintended ways or
with unintended consequences. For the present paper, we restrict our attention to those
forms of interaction that are mediated by actors. In the underlying system model, actors
will be represented either as resources, when they are passive components of a model
or, more typically, as processes, where they manage and navigate through architectures.
We identify three key ways in which hierarchies may interact, namely composition,
substitution, and stacking. We conjecture that, given our restriction to actor-mediated
interaction, these three forms of interaction are all that is required to describe con-
veniently and naturally the architectures commonly found in services ecosystems. This
conjecture can be formulated precisely in terms of the underlying mathematical systems
model, for which there is a rich theory of the expressiveness of concurrent composition
operators (e.g., [11, 25, 26]). The details are beyond the scope of this informal paper.
It should be noted here that, although the use of ‘actors’ is a convenient abstraction
here, it remains the case that our intended leading applications are primarily concerned
with policy assurance/compliance for organizational hierarchies, with their associated
‘human factors’. This intent influences our design decisions directly.
4.1 Composition
Composition, as illustrated in Fig. 3, is perhaps the most basic form of interaction be-
tween architectures. A key component of composition is the presence of some actors
in both hierarchies — the dotted lines in Fig. 3 indicate that some actors may populate
roˆles in both hierarchies. In order for this to be possible, we must require that such
actors must be able to move themselves and/or resources between the two hierarchies.
This in turn requires that locations in the one hierarchy be connected to locations in the
other (recall locations can be logical and/or physical). Of course, the two hierarchies in
Fig. 3 might have the stronger property of sharing locations L and resources R.
For an example — illustrating the use of our framework to assess security vulner-
abilities and possible attacks that may arise from composing architectures — consider
again our running example of airport security. Consider the security architecture as
sketched so far. Its purpose is to ensure certain integrity properties of people who get
airside (no weapons, no liquids that can be used to make bombs, etc.). Now, the airport
also exploits the airside location as part of its business process: it seeks to sell stuff to
passengers who are waiting to board aircraft, so that bottles of liquids that would be
blocked by the security process are available in airside stores.
So, as a result of composing the security architecture and the business architec-
ture, with shared locations, resources, and actors, we have a possible vulnerability and
attack. A terrorist clears security with nothing to identify her and nothing that is pro-
hibited. Similarly, an accomplice, who is a staff member in the newsagent’s airside
store, passes through security without question. However, the newsagent’s supply chain
is compromised, and there is a shrink-wrapped case of water bottles containing bomb-
making fluids, and the location of these bottles in the case is known to the staff-member
accomplice (here we assume that the fluids in the bottles for sale airside have not all
been individually tested for their chemical composition). The terrorist can then buy the
bomb-making liquids from the accomplice, so undermining the security architecture.
Fig. 3. Security Architecture: Composing Hierarchies
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How, then, should we analyse this situation? The problem arises from the sharing
of locations and resources by the two architectures, with some actors able to be part of
both hierarchies without the integrity properties of actors and the resources to which
they have access that are required by one architecture being guaranteed by the other.
Moreover, if an actor inhabits roˆles in two hierarchies, what are the conflicts between
the SOs and SCs associated with those roˆles?
Our approach gives a framework within which the factors that contribute to failures
and circumventions of security policies and controls can be identified, isolated, and han-
dled. Moreover, when implemented in a simulation tool, the impact of vulnerabilities in
a range of threat scenarios can be explored. For example, for a vulnerability such as the
‘water bottles’ described above, the likelihood of a successful attack can be explored.
4.2 Substitution
The next form of interaction is substitution, illustrated in Fig 4. Here one hierarchy (the
child, on the right) is used to refine a roˆle in another (the parent, on the left, roˆle in
bold). We must require that the declarative and operational properties of the roˆle that
is replaced are respected in the child hierarchy. Note there is no necessary requirement
here for the parent and child to share resources and locations (cf. stacking, below).
For substitution to be defined, the parent and child hierarchies must fit together
properly, as described below. This definition can be given mathematically in terms of
the underlying system model; here we aim to give a precise, informal definition of how
a child hierarchy is substituted into the parent, replacing a roˆle.
- In the Framework Layer, each dependency (resp. priority) that occurs in an SO in
the roˆle in the parent that is replaced (]) must have a corresponding dependency
Fig. 4. Security Architecture: Substituting Hierarchies
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(respectively priority) at level 1 in an SO in the child that replaces it. Similarly,
corresponding to any dependency (resp. priority) in an SO in the parent that is
derived from a dependency (resp. priority) in the roˆle that is replaced, there must
be a dependency (resp. priority) at level n+1 in the child that replaces it. Thus the
SO in the child refines the dependencies (resp. priorities) replaced in the parent.
- In the Instantiation Layer, each dependency (resp. priority) that occurs in an SC
in the roˆle in the parent hierarchy that is replaced ([) must have a corresponding
dependency (respectively priority) at level n+ 1 in an SC in the child that replaces
it. Similarly, any dependency (resp. priority) in an SC the parent that is derived
from (going upwards, of course) on any dependency (resp. priority) in the roˆle that
is replaced must have a corresponding dependency (resp. priority) at level 1 in an
SC in the child that replaces it. Thus the SC in the child refines the dependencies
(resp. priorities) replaced in the parent.
The child hierarchy must provide all of the declarative and operational capabilities as-
sociated with the dependencies and priorities in the roˆle that it replaces — formally, this
is expressed in terms of processes and resources in the underlying system model, but the
details are omitted in this informal description. An example of the use of substitution,
together with the associated facility to support the identification of vulnerabilities and
associated attacks, is given in § 5.
4.3 Stacking
We can also combine hierarchies vertically — giving a natural approach to modelling
multilayered architectures — to form what we call stacks, in which one hierarchy sits
immediately below another.
The formation of stacks is similar to substitution, in that we can think of them
as being formed by substituting (as defined above) a child hierarchy for the bottom
roˆle in the parent hierarchy. Critically, however, in stacks there may be actors that are
common to both the upper and lower hierarchy with, correspondingly, shared locations
and resources. Thus stacking combines aspects of both substitution and composition.
The left-hand diagram in Fig. 5 illustrates a stack of two hierarchies.
To form this stack of (two) hierarchies, we start with a basic one, as in Fig. 2, with
layers 1 tom+1. We then substitute a second one, with its own layers labelled 1 to n+1,
at layer m + 1, according to the definition of substitution given above. We then obtain
a hierarchy with layers 1 to m+ n+ 1, with layers m+ 1 to m+ n+ 1 corresponding
to the layers 1 to n+ 1 from the second layer. The right-hand diagram in Fig. 5 depicts
the three-layer cloud ecosystem stack, discussed below.
5 Extending the Running Example: Outsourcing to the Cloud
Having established our modelling theory using the familiar example of airport secu-
rity as an illustrative example, we now consider the example of a cloud-based services
ecosystem [27–29]. Three-layered approaches are common in designing and modelling
software system architectures (e.g., [30]) and we adopt this approach here. Specifically,
we suppose an infrastructure layer, upon which is stacked a service layer, upon which
is stacked a social layer.
The infrastructure layer provides the hardware and middleware platforms — that is,
the underlying cloud infrastructure — for the ecosystem. The service layer provides the
software — both its development and/or maintenance and sales to business users. The
social layer is where the end-user customers access services provided by the business
users — for example, a bank’s personal customers may use security software to support
internet banking, with the software being a collection of programs obtained by the bank
from a broker in the service layer who aggregates a security service.
The right-hand diagram in Fig. 5, illustrating the cloud ecosystem stack, hides the
roˆle layers that were replaced when the stack was formed by substitution. For exam-
ple, the Service Layer replaces a (bottom) roˆle in the Social Layer that describes the
provision of suitable software.
Table 3 illustrates the dependencies in the Service Layer. Table 4 illustrates how
priorities, for example, cross between stacked hierarchies: the SC tree connects the
priority of the SaaS Broker to that of the Business User.
To conclude this example, recall the airport security example. Suppose, as part of
the security process, some identities must be checked. The security staff may, for ex-
ample, need to use an email or other messaging service in order to obtain confirmation
of an identity. Clearly, establishing the integrity of such messages will be a dependency
for the airport’s security manager. To this end, the manager might outsource integrity
checking to a specialist (SaaS) email scanning provider. In terms of the security archi-
tecture, this will be an instance of substitution.
The process of sending an email intended for an airport employee is the follow-
ing: Original Email → Internet → Airport Firewall → Domain Server → Client PC
→ Recipient. A SaaS offering scans email and performs a series of checks to ensure
Fig. 5. Security Architecture: Stacking Hierarchies (left) with Cloud Example (right)
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Table 3.
Roˆle Dependencies Security Components
SaaS Broker Ensure compliance for SaaS re-
quirements
Ensure availability of SaaS audit
data
Implement procedure to supply au-
dit outcomes to Regulator
Implement procedure to obtain au-
dit data from SaaS provider
SaaS Provider Ensure log data available to SaaS
Broker
Implement secure, adequately re-
trievable archiving
Table 4.
Roˆle Priorities Security Components
Customer Obtain a good service
Business User Acknowledge contact from cus-
tomers promptly
Respond to customer by email
within 2 working days
SaaS Broker Contact SaaS Provider with per-
formance feedback sufficiently
promptly for feedback to be useful
Email SaaS Provider within 6
months of beginning service con-
tract
messages are free from malicious software, and their integrity is intact; that is, the ap-
parent originator is the actual sender of a message. Then the process is, essentially:
Original Email→ Internet→ SaaS→ Email Scanned and Tagged→ Internet→ Air-
port Firewall→ Domain Server→ Client PC→ Recipient. Message tags are added by
the SaaS prior to forwarding: Checked (message is considered safe); Spam (unwelcome
or unsolicited source); Alert (message has failed a test). The operator has the option of
releasing the message. There is clearly a risk that a non-security aware operator will
release the message and enable malicious content to attack connected airport IT. There
is also a dependency that the SaaS be available.
A larger risk is that the integrity of the data within the email is now trusted to se-
curity controls that exist within the SaaS business model: typically, there will be less
transparency in the outsourced (i.e., substituted) setting concerning the controls that are
applied to determine which actors are used to fill which roˆles. In our running example,
focus is therefore on differences between airport security controls and those of the SaaS
offering. Vetting procedures required for airport staff are in general tougher than those
for the staff employed by a SaaS operator. The relevant employee of the SaaS provider
will have access to a system able to access airport email traffic, and sign it as secure.
In the absence of tougher checks on this particular employee, there is a potential vul-
nerability that the employee could exploit in order to carry out a targeted attack. If the
service has previously performed well, and the user trusts the tags appended to checked
messages, then the resulting attack might have a high probability of success. The SaaS
provider’s ability to hold these contracts is quite tightly bound to their not allowing such
breaches, and it is not clear the contractual incentives will necessarily ensure that vet-
ting standards are well-matched to the sensitivities of the tasks determined by the SOs
and implemented by the SCs. Our framework provides a way to organize the inclusion
of appropriate standards for appropriate tasks in the contractual structure.
Thus, as in § 4.1, we see that our architectural framework provides a framework for
identifying, analyzing, and handling the vulnerabilities and associated attack vectors
related to with security design choices.
6 Modelling and Tool Support
The next stage of this work has three key aspects. First, we must provide a mathemati-
cally precise account of the relationship between the underlying system models (based
on locations, resources, and processes [4, 3]) and the architectures described here, in-
cluding the key relationship between models/architectures and their environments. We
have alluded this work here, but defer presentation of the details to another occasion.
Second, we must provide a systematic account of how utility-theoretic approaches
to resource allocation and investment decision-making in security are to be integrated
with our account of architectures [23, 31, 8, 9].
Third, we must develop tools to support the use of the architectural models de-
scribed in this paper to assess, systematically, how the interaction between different
processes can give rise to security vulnerabilities and attacks. A key aspect of this ap-
proach, building on both the first and second steps above, will be to simulate the be-
haviour of systems and architectures in the presence of different threat intensities; that
is, in the terms of § 2, different probabilities of possible attacks that are incident from
the environment.
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